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This paper is timely. In spite of the increase in disembodied communication through text 
messaging and e-mail, the fields of logic and rhetoric increasingly recognize how much 
we lose in comprehension if we ignore the significance of who spoke the words, with 
what emotion, and in what physical setting.  
In 1968, at the time of Robert Kennedy’s speech in Indianapolis, the prevailing 
theory would have been that the words must be judged independent of the speaker. If 
Kennedy argued that the assassination of Martin Luther King must not be met with 
further violence but with love, wisdom, compassion and the desire for justice, then his 
conclusion would be justified only if his words alone were enough to support it. Today 
we are much more ready to understand that we may lose a crucial part of the significance 
of those words unless, in Warrenburg’s words, we “foreground” the impact of them being 
spoken by a white male political candidate on an improvised stage to a primarily black 
audience. Warrenburg’s research investigates the actual impact of the speech on people 
who were in the audience, showing how the physical experience was crucial to their 
interpretation.  
This “visceral” component of the reasoning is present equally in both speaker and 
listeners. The body which “holds one there in the action, moment, and/or experience” (p. 
2) is in Kennedy’s case white, male, privileged, and yet vulnerable, facing the listeners 
whose bodies are black, not privileged, but less vulnerable by being the majority. The 
word “visceral” invites us not just to recognize the physical elements of a speech but to 
embrace a dual perspective: both how the outside of the arguer’s body appears to others, 
and how the inside of one’s own body reacts to the giving or receiving of argument.  
We may be ready to accept that non-verbal elements of an argument should be 
factored into the impact of an argument, but the question is how? As Warrenburg notes, 
there is an immediate problem in being sure we have correctly interpreted the experiential 
elements: “Body arguments are open to multiple readings” (p. 8). It is much easier to 
judge whether these elements do in fact succeed in persuading the audience than to judge 
whether they should succeed. Kennedy’s audience did not riot—but should they have? 
Were they properly persuaded just because he was there in person? 
The challenge lies in deciding how to weigh visceral elements appropriately as 
supporting or undermining the conclusion of an argument. I will suggest two ways we 
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might deal with the visceral components of an argument. Both may be useful in deciding 
whether the argument should be accepted. One approach treats the visceral elements as 
part of the argument. The other approach treats the visceral elements as indicative of the 
relationship between arguer and audience. This relationship is not part of the argument 
but is a precondition for what kind of interaction the argument can be, and therefore 
whether the argument could succeed. Both approaches are compatible with Warrenburg’s 
interpretation: will either one takes the theory forward?  
To set up the two approaches, consider one key statement in Kennedy’s speech:  
“a white man killed my brother.” It is a key premise in Kennedy’s argument: although he 
is white and cannot directly experience how black people feel when one of their own is 
killed by a white man, he can at the most visceral level understand what it is to have a 
brother assassinated because he was a political leader. If Warrenburg is right, it is crucial 
that he speak these words in person. We can test the hypothesis that his presence ought to 
make a difference to his argument by imaging the impact of the same premise presented 
in other ways. For example, suppose Kennedy appears not live but televised. Delivered 
on screen instead of in person, his words become much weaker because his screen 
presence says, “I was not willing to face you in person.” To restore the argument to its 
intended strength, he would need to add words that excuse his absence. For example, he 
could send a black spokesperson to deliver his apology, and then say, “Kennedy asked 
me to remind you that a white man killed his brother.” The credibility of the argument is 
increased relative to the televised appearance. The black spokesperson’s willingness to 
act on Kennedy’s behalf tells the black community that at least one of their number finds 
Kennedy credible. At the opposite extreme, suppose the words are spoken by a white 
man, perhaps someone like 1960s Chicago mayor Richard Daley—anyone who might 
plausibly enforce his preferences on a resistant public. The physical presence of such a 
white man in front of a black audience actually undermines the argument—if the speaker 
could enforce “no violence,” that coercive element outweighs all the spoken reasoning 
and makes it at best a polite façade. 
Yet the soundness of the premise is identical in all three cases. It is true that 
Robert Kennedy’s brother Jack was killed by a white man, and implicitly this does further 
establish that Robert Kennedy understands at least part of how black people might feel 
about the death of Dr. Martin Luther King. But this truth does and should have 
significantly different impact as a premise in the argument depending on whether it is 
presented in person, on screen, by a black spokesperson, or by a “Mayor Daley.” How do 
we effectively measure the impact of these physical and contextual changes? 
The first way we could handle the impact is to weigh the visceral components 
themselves as additional evidence. There is precedent for this in the move towards 
weighing emotion in reasoning. For example, Jean Nienkamp (2005) argues that “data 
with a high emotional content” is warranted in certain situations, and gives as one key 
example the law’s use of victim impact testimony in the 1997 trial of Timothy McVeigh 
for the Oklahoma City bombing. To weigh emotion effectively, Nienkamp suggests Peter 
Goldie’s criteria: “intelligibility, appropriateness, and proportionality of emotions” 
(Nienkamp 2005, p. 346) Along the same lines, my colleague Anastasia Anderson drew 
on her work with Aristotle and the emotions to develop the following criteria for critical 
thinking in general. Emotions are supporting elements in argument when: (i) emotions 
signal an unconscious recognition of important aspects of a person or situation, (ii) 
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emotions legitimately tip the balance in favour of a particular course of action because all 
other factors are even, or (iii) the desired outcome of the argument is to be in a particular 
emotional state. Conversely, emotions fail to support, or undermine a conclusion, when 
(i) we cannot pinpoint the true cause of the emotion, (ii) our emotions are affected by our 
physiological state, or (iii) emotions blind us to certain aspects of a situation or problem. 
(Kloster & Anderson 2006, Ch. 7, 9)  By these criteria, the visceral components of 
Kennedy’s argument will indeed provide the support Warrenburg expects. Kennedy’s 
physical presence triggers recognition by the crowd of what he has done by coming in 
person, and the desired impact is to cool the potential anger of the crowd—to change 
their emotional state. 
The second way we could handle the impact of visceral elements is to step back 
from the reasoning into the power relationship(s) of the participants. Power relationships 
are often ignored in reasoning. One enduring myth of the logical approach to argument is 
that the truth has equal power no matter who speaks it. The truth—and only the truth—is 
what must be accepted. However, part of the appeal of the “visceral” model is that it 
acknowledges that Kennedy’s vulnerability when facing a black crowd—his relative lack 
of power—is precisely what gives his argument the positive force it ought to have. His 
speech in Indianapolis is a nice example of why our presumption of “equal entitlement to 
speak” can be misguided. And we may need to fight for the right: here may be times 
when we are not heard even though we should be. However, more importantly, there are 
also times that we should not speak because it is not our voice which needs to be heard. 
Warrenburg is, in my opinion, right to stress that Kennedy’s vulnerability is crucial to the 
success of his argument. A black spokesperson for Kennedy is a little less vulnerable and 
embodies a different component of the tension around racial identity. The relationship of 
speaker to crowd is different, and so the success of the argument will not necessarily 
match Kennedy’s delivery of the same words. Could it, or should it, work equally well?  
We can’t know until we know the details of the spokesperson’s identity and power. 
Conversely, a “Mayor Daley” has much greater power over the audience, but power so 
unrelated to the peaceable words that the words become effectively irrelevant. The 
cogency of the argument is—and should be—completely undermined because the 
speaker has too much power relative to the audience.  
Looking at power relationships directly takes us in quite a different direction from 
treating visceral elements like other non-verbal elements such as pictures and emotions. I 
suggest that the question for rhetoricians and logicians is whether this direction will work 
better or worse than treating visceral information as premises of the argument.  
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